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interest in effective judicial administration. Choosing the former would mean
application of the traditional equity rule by the Supreme Court;" choosing the
latter would allow the states to apply Mineworkers17 The Supreme Court may
have made the latter choice in denying certiorari in Aladdin"8 and Bogle v. lakes
Foundry.9 If the decision is yet to be made, it is submitted that the potential
effect of the enforcement of state injunctions upon federal labor relations policy
is sufficient both to render the decision a matter of federal law and to warrant
that the federal courts adopt the traditional equity rule in regard to such injunc-
tions.
6 See note 3 supra. Although this is the course of action most favorable to the employees, it
is not an ideal solution from their point of view either. First, they would be forced to risk in-
curring substantial fines and imprisonment in following their own evaluation of the state
court's power to act. Secondly, disobedience would not be available as a means of neutralizing
a state court injunction issued without jurisdiction should the state government elect to en-
force its temporary decree through direct police action-such as arresting and confining
strikers-rather than through initiating contempt actions in the courts.
67 See notes 4-6 supra, and accompanying text.
68 361 U.S. 865 (1959). 69 362 U.S. 401 (1960).
USE OF STATE STATUTES BY FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
IN EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE OF PROCESS
In Kappas v. Western Hills Oil, Inc.,' a federal district court interpreted Rule
4(d)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 as authorizing use of a state
statute providing for extraterritorial service of process upon a nonresident de-
fendant.3 Rule 4(d)(7) provides that it is "sufficient if the summons and com-
plaint are served... in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which
service is made for the service of summons [or] other like process upon any such
defendant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that
state." 4 Prior opinions have stated that 4(d) (7) must be interpreted as authoriz-
124 F.R.D. 123 (E.D. Wis. 1959).
2 Congress has delegated the rule making power to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1958).
3 There has been considerable discord in the federal courts as to the situations in which
extraterritorial service is authorized by the Rules. Compare Farr v. Cia. Intercontinental De
Navegacio de Cuba, 243 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1957), and Giffin v. Ensign, 234 F.2d 307 (3d Cir.
1956), and Hellriegel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957), will: Heiser
Ready Mix Co. v. Fenton, 265 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1959) and Pasternack v. Dalo, 17 F.R.D.
420 (W.D. Pa. 1955), and Johnson v. Scarborough, 88 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Tex. 1949).
4 "[IThe law of the state in which service is made" might conceivably be read to mean
that the law which governs service is that of the state in which the defendant receives notice
of the action, rather than the state from which service emanates. Such a construction would
have absurd results in that each district court would be empowered to serve nationwide
process, conforming only to the state statute providing for intrastate personal service in what-
ever state the defendant might be found. Although the language of the Rule is inherently am-
biguous, the Rule makes sense only if the state law referred to is that of the state in which the
district court sits. No court has made a contrary interpretation.
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ing use of state statutes only for intrastate service because of the prohibition
in Rule 4(f) that service may be made only "within the territorial limits of the
state in which the district court is held....",
The consequence of this restrictive interpretation of Rule 4(d)(7) was avoided
in Volbrook v. Cafiero,6 where it was decided that substituted service7 upon
an official of the state from which service emanates would enable the court
to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.8 In Kappus the conflict
between the opposing point of view was presented in its most fundamental
form, since the state statute in question, having eliminated substituted service,9
prevented reliance upon Holbrook.10
Those who maintain that Rule 4(f) limits the application of Rule 4(d)(7)
contend that their position does not violate the doctrine that all parts of a
statute are to be construed in pari materia," since each rule supposedly has its
5 McCoy v. Siler, 205 F.2d 498, 501 (3rd Cir. 1953) (concurring opinion of Maris, J.);
Nemiec v. Interstate Motor Freight System, 2 F.R.D. 408 (W.D. Mich. 1942).
'18 F. R.D 218 (D. Md. 1955).
7 In this comment "substituted service" will refer only to the procedure by which process
is served on an official of the state in which suit is brought with notice subsequently being
sent to the nonresident defendant.
8 "The wording of the statute clearly shows that the servie is made on the Secretary of State
and, of course, must be witlin te state." That the state official subsequently notifies the de-
fendant by registered mail of the service of process is a procedure necessary only to "conform
... to the federal constitutional provision requiring due process.. . ." Holbrook v. Cafiero,
18 F.R.D. 218, 223-24 (D. Md. 1955). The standard referred to was promulgated in Wuchter
v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S.13 (1928): "[T]he act of a nonresident in using the highways of another
state may properly be declared to be an agreement to accept service of summons in a suit
growing out of the use of the highway by the owner of the automobile, but the enforced accept-
ance of the service of process on a state officer by the defendant would not be fair or due process
unless such officer or the plaintiff is required to mail the notice to the defendant, or... make
it reasonably probable that he will receive actual notice." Many cases have used reasoning
similar to that employed in Holbrook in holding that Rule 4 (d) (7) authorizes substituted
service on a state official followed by transmission of notice to the defendant. See, e.g., Paster-
nack v. Dalo, 17 F.R.D. 420 (W.D. Pa. 1955); Giffin v. Ensign, 15 F.R.D. 200 (M.D. Pa-
1953); Moon v. Makowski, 114 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Ohio 1953). In Giffin v. Ensign, 234 F.2d
307, 311 (3rd Cir. 1956), however, the Third Circuit reached the same result without seeming
to place much reliance on the substituted service feature of the state statute there involved.
9 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.09 (4) (1957). "If the defendant is a foreign corporation... and
... (b) the cause of action against it arose out of the doing of business in Wisconsin, service
may be made.., by delivering within or without the state a copy of the summons to any
officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation."
10 It is true, of course, that extraterritorial service is never upheld where there is no federal
or state statute so authorizing. Hanes Supply Co. v. Valley Evaporating Co., 261 F.2d 29
(5th Cir. 1958); Hagan v. Central Avenue Dairy, 180 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1950); Hygeia Dairy
v. Benson, 151 F.Supp. 661 (S.D. Tex. 1957); McDaniel v. Drotman, 103 F. Supp.643 (W.D.
Ky. 1952); Miller v. Hano, 8 F.R.D. 67 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
n It is the duty of the courts to prevent separate parts of a statute from being mutually
restrictive. Federal Power Commission v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 337 U.S. 498 (1949);
International Rice Milling Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 21(5th Cir. 1950), rev'd. on other grounds,
341 U.S. 665 (1951); Dealer's Transport Co. v. Reese, 138 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1943). The parts
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own sphere of influence. The proposition is advanced that Rule 4(d) (7) permits
use only of statutes which determine the manner and mode of service, not
those allowing extraterritorial service. Rule 4(f), on the other hand, is purported-
ly an absolute prohibition against out-of-state service. It must be remembered
in this context that the courts in construing the Rules have the duty of giving
"full expression to the meaning of the words used without one rule modifying
another."'"
The Kappus argument points out that 4(d)(7) and 4(f) were meant to be
applicable to different facets of the same procedure, i.e., service of process.
Rule 4(f) was intended to permit a district court to extend its service to the
entire state in which it was sitting. Previously such service had been permitted
only within the district. Rule 4(f), it is argued, was intended to have no effect
whatever on 4(d) (7).13 It would seem that an interpretation of the Rules
under which 4(d) (7) is limited by 4(f) not only overly restricts the natural mean-
ing of the words of 4(d)(7), but at the same time ignores the very language of
4(f). Rule 4(d) (7) is presently excluded from the purview of 4(f) by the exception
that extraterritorial service may be made "when a statute of the United States
so provides .... "4 The Federal Rules, while not having complete statutory
power, closely approximate that authority. Indeed, a number of cases have
attributed the complete efficacy of statutes to the Federal Rules. 6 If Rule
4(d)(7) were regarded as a "statute" within the meaning of 4(f), there would
be no doubt that the Kappus interpretation is correct and the two rules would
be entirely consistent. However, the Advisory Committee for the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure has proposed an amendment to Rule 4(f) which
might be said to lead to the opposite conclusion. This new rule would provide
that: "All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the
territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held, and when a
statute of the United States or these rules so provide, beyond the territorial
should, as far as is possible, be harmonized with each other and with the general intent of the
lawmaking body. Fleischmarm Const. Co. v. United States ex. rel. Forsberg, 270 U.S.
349 (1926); Iglehart v. Iglehart, 204 U.S. 478 (1907). Toward this end, it has often been held
that the Federal Rules are to be considered as being in pari materia. Panamusica Venezuela
C.A. v. American Steel Export Co., 16 F.R.D. 280 (S.D. N.Y. 1954); North v. Lehigh Valley
Transit Co., 10 F.R.D. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Agricultural Lands, Inc. v. Panhandle & S.F.Ry.,
60 F. Supp. 108 (W.D. Mo. 1945).
Westland Oil Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 3 F.R.D. 55, 56 (D. N.Dak. 1943).
13 "We think that it can be said fairly that Rule 4(f) does not address itself to or cover
nonresident procedures authorized by State law, which are the subject of Rule 4(d)(7). That
conclusion, and no more, is needed to decide this case. The service was lawful." Giffin v. Ensign,
234 F.2d 307, 311 (3rd Cir. 1956).
14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
'5 Sinsor v. Daumit, 179 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1950); John R. Alley & Co. v. Federal National
Bank, 124 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1942). Beasley v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. S.C.
1948); Nash v. Raun, 67 F. Supp. 212 (W.D. Pa. 1946);
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limits of the state."'" (New portion in italics.) It can be argued that the proposed
amendment represents an implicit admission that the term "statute" does
not embrace the Federal Rules as Rule 4(f) is presently worded. By specifically
differentiating between "statute" and "rules" the .Committee confesses that
4(d)(7) is currently inadequate to overcome the prohibition placed upon
service beyond state lines by Rule 4(f). But a more powerful argument may
be made for the alternative: the new rule is meant to be nothing more than a
clarification of the original formulation of the drafters, which has been miscon-
strued by many federal courts. 17 This position makes possible the avoidance of
difficulties arising out of the application of the pari matera principle, since
it is only in this fashion that the two rules can be fully reconciled.
The Advisory Committee adopts the Kappus interpretation as the proper
one. In commenting upon the amendment, it says that the doctrine of restriction
"prevents use of this convenient means [nonresident motorist statutes] for suing
at the place where the accident occurred."' Is The Committee's stand is more
clearly defined by the comments upon an almost identical amendment to
Rule 4(e):'1 "It [the amendment] will remove doubt and allay confusion to
permit suits in the diversity jurisdiction" to proceed "in conformity with state
practice .... "2o (Emphasis supplied.) Yet certain as its stand is upon this mat-
ter, the Committee neglects to refute many of the arguments advanced by the
proponents of the thesis that 4(f) limits the operation of 4(d)(7).
A major advantage seen by the advocates of the restrictive interpretation
is that under this interpretation fewer cases are brought in the federal district
courts under the diversity jurisdiction.2 It has become evident that thereasons
for originally conferring diversity jurisdiction on the federal courts are not as
compelling as they once were. The clear superiority of the federal courts in
both procedure and quality of the bench is rapidly disappearing. Moreover,
16ADvisoay ComnEE REPoRT or PROPOSED AmENDMENTS To TE RULEs oF CIvI.
PROCEDuRE 10-12 (1955) (hereinafter cited as ADvisoRY Comu. REP.).
17 "In 1938 [the year in which the Federal Rules became effective] there were at least
forty State statutes affecting nonresident motorists; and it seems almost inescapable that if
Rule 4(f) was intended to override Rule 4(d) (7) some discussion would have been had on such
an important change." Giffin v. Ensign, 234 F.2d 307, 312 n.4 (3rd Cir. 1956).
18 ADviSORY Comm. REP., 12.
19 "Whenever a statute of the United States or these rules provides for service of summons,
or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found with-
in the state, service shall be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the
statute, rule, or order. Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is
held provides for notice to such a party to appear and respond to or defend in an action by reason
of the attachment or garnishment of his property located within the state, or for service of a summons,
notice, or order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state,
it shall also be sufficient if service is made or the party is brought before the court under the circum-
stances and in the manner prescribed in the state statutes or rules." (New portion in italics.)
20 ADvisoaR Comm. REP., 8-9.
21 It has been estimated that between thirty and thirty-seven percent of all diversity cases
involve automobile accidents. Doub, Time for Re-Evaluation: Shall We Curtail Diversity
Jurisdiction?, 44 A.B.A.J. 243, 278 (1958).
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maintaining a suit in the federal system is often more expensive than main-
taining it in the state courts 2
Insofar as limiting the business of the federal courts is an unarticulated
consideration in the minds of those judges adopting the prohibitive theory
of 4(f), it would appear that they have fallen into the error of legislating by
judicial fiat. It is for Congress alone to promulgate measures curtailing the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.2 3 The increase in number of diversity cases
resulting from the use of 4(d)(7) exemplified in Kappus would seem to be
the result of legislative intent, and the courts are in no position to bring about
a contrary result.
2 4
2 See generally, Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supren Court and the Erie Doctrine
isn Diversity Cases, 67 YAix L.J. 187, 195-97 (1957). Professor Kurland concludes that while
the federal courts "offer juries chosen from a broader geographical base and, generally, from
a group of higher economic and social status,... none of these considerations seems to justify
the existence of diversity jurisdiction in our federal system today." Id. at 197.
"In my opinion the greatest contribution that Congress could make to the orderly adminis-
tration of justice in the United States would be to abolish the jurisdiction of the federal
courts which is based solely on the ground that the litigants are citizens of different states."
JAcKSON, THE SumREmr, COuRT n; a Asmmicu SsTEx oF GovmF~ ramN 38 (1955). For
a defense of the diversity jurisdiction, see Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts,
51 Nw. L. REv. 407, 409 (1956).
23 There have been indications that Congress intends to do just that. "[A] corporation shall
be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where
it has its principal place of business." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(c) (1958).
21 Ignoring the 4(d)(7)-4(f) conflict altogether, some courts have gone so far as to apply
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), to the solution of the problem. Substance and
procedure being the inexact categories that they are, it is not extraordinary that a number of
courts have sought to apply Erie to uphold extraterritorial service. They admit thereby that
they consider service of process to be substantive. See Clark, The Tompkins Case and the
Federal Rde, 1 F.R.D. 417 (1940). However, while there are cases which have held some of the
Federal Rules substantive, it is believed that service of process should be classified as procedur-
al. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) held Rule 3 substantive. See also
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). But cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Elec. Corp., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). For cases classifying the Federal Rules as procedural, see
Whitaker & Co. v. Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 1, 221 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1955); Occidental
Life Ins. Co. of California v. Kielhorn, 98 F.Supp. 288 (W.D. Mich. 1951); Kuper v. Johns,
94 F.Supp. 305 (S.D. W.Va. 1950). If service of process were considered substantive, Erie
would apply, and the federal courts would become obligated to use the state statutes. If this
were the case, there would be no need for 4(d)(7), since the function it purports to perform
could be effected without it. In that situation, it would have been seen that 4(d)(7) was super-
fluous, and it would have been eliminated by now. It would be contrary to long standing
precedent were service of process to be labelled substantive at this late date.
Another fault to be found with the use of Erie becomes manifest when the essential nature
of the 4(d) (7) problem is considered. Rule 4(f) states that extraterritorial service may be made
only "when a statute of the United States so provides... ." We can assume, for these purposes,
that either 4(d) (7) fulfills this requirement or it does not, and that its application will stand
or fall upon the ultimate resolution of this problem. If it is a "statute," Erie becomes unneces-
sary. If it is not, by what manner can case law succeed where a quasi-statute, more authorita-
tive, cannot?
Notwithstanding, a number of cases have used Erie. "By driving on the highways of the
State of Illinois, a nonresident driver is submitting himself to the laws of the State of Illinois
and is making himself amenable to personal service of summons.... This amenableness to
personal service of summons extends to any court sitting in the State which applies the law of
the State and when a federal court in a diversity case applies the substantive law of the
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The notion of expanding the number of cases in the diversity jurisdiction
should not be confused with an expansion of that jurisdiction itself. Rule
4(d)(7), when used to permit extraterritorial service, might be thought to
abridge the substantive rights of defendants. But closer analysis shows that this
is not the case. It has been feared that 4(d)(7) could be used to overcome
venue requirements.25 In McCoy v. Siler,6 however, it was the opinion of the
court that the defendant, by driving upon the highways of another state, did
not waive the federal venue provisions. Suit had to be maintained in the district
where all the plaintiffs or all the defendants resided; the venue statute did not
give way to 4(d) (7).217 Similarly, it has been thought that 4(d) (7) infringes upon
the substantive rights of the defendant in subjecting him to the jurisdiction
of a court to which he previously could not have been summoned. This conten-
tion ignores the fact that the Rule is merely "a kind of catchall, providing that
in classes (1) and (3) above-that is, those dealing with the individual or the
corporation or association-any form of service which would be good in the
State where the district court is sitting shall also be held good in the federal
court. '28 Its justification was convenience, not expansion of jurisdiction.
Nor does Rule 4(f) expand either jurisdiction or venue. Its purpose was to
expand, rather, the present rule as to where service may be made. As was
concluded by the Supreme Court: "Rule 4(f) serves only to implement the juris-
diction over the subject matter which Congress has conferred, by providing a
procedure by which the defendant may be brought into court at a place where
Congress has declared that the suit may be maintained."29 It would seem
State in which it sits, it is just another State court insofar as that suit is concerned." Star
v. Rogalny, 162 F.Supp. 181, 184 (E.D. Ill. 1957). But see Taylor v. Reading Co., 23 F.R.D.
186 (E.D. Pa. 1958); B-Amused Co. v. Melrose Sporting Club, Inc., 168 F.Supp. 709 (E.D.
N.Y. 1958); Rensingv. Turner Aviation Corp., 166 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ill. 1958).
2528 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1958). "A Civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversi-
ty of citizenship may... be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all de-
fendants reside."
26205 F.2d 498 (3rd Cir. 1953).
27 This view was subsequently affirmed in Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S.
338 (1953). A number of cases have held that the appointment of an agent for service of
process by drivers on state highways was a waiver of federal venue rights. .E.g., Falter v. South-
west Wheel Co., 109 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1953); Archambeau v. Emerson, 108 F. Supp.
28 (W.D. Mich. 1952); Jacobson v. Schumann, 105 F. Supp. 483 (D. Vt. 1952).
21 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Proceedings of the American Bar Association
Institute at 205 (1938).
21 Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946). Earlier lower court
decisions had recognized that Rule 4(f) did not result in a substantive expansion of jurisdiction.
Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Co., 153 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1946); Schwartz v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills,
110 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1940); O'Leary v. Loften, 3 F.R.D. 36 (E.D. N.Y. 1942); Williams
v. James, 34 F.Supp. 61 (W.D. La. 1940); Devier v. George Cole Motor Co., 27 F. Supp.
978 (W.D. Va. 1939). Contra: Gibbs v. Emerson Electric Mfg. Co., 35 F. Supp. 213 (W.D.
Mo. 1940); Carby v. Greco, 31 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Ky. 1940); Melekov v. Collins, 30 F. Supp.
1.59 (S.D. Calif. 1939).
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strange that a rule meant to "implement" jurisdiction should be employed
to restrict the "implementation" afforded by Rule 4(d)(7).
A distinct problem exists concerning the "federal question" jurisdiction
of the federal courts.30 If 4(d)(7) authorizes out-of-state service, it would
appear that state statutes are being used to implement enforcement of federally
created rights. The ability of the federal courts to subject the defendant to
jurisdiction would seem to vary from state to state, depending upon the statute
employed. However, in practice this variance would be slight. The extraterri-
torial service of process statutes vary remarkably little from state to state.
It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a plaintiff might be prohibited from
obtaining jurisdiction over the defendant solely because of a variance in the
state statute. In addition, Section 1404(a) of the judiciary Act 3' would serve
to protect the defendant from any severe injustice resulting from being served
extraterritorially, since the suit would be transferred to a more convenient
forum if the circumstances required it. Whatever variance there is would appear
to bring about a situation resembling that which existed under the Conformity
Act.32 This act provided that, outside of equity and admiralty cases, federal
practice had to conform as nearly as possible to the practice of the state in which
the district court was sitting. The result was general confusion and a complete
lack of uniformity in the procedures of the various federal courts. It was to
achieve a single procedural standard that the Federal Rules were promulgated.
Nevertheless, 4(d) (7) appears to be an exception to the otherwise consistent
desire to escape the disorder generated by the Conformity Act. Four (d)(7)
specifically allows use of state statutes. In the area of service of process, Congress
has manifested an intent to permit the courts to proceed in this manner. Here
again the proposition that the courts perforce must abide by legislative intent
appears controlling. It would seem then, that all arguments based upon the
case law, upon the intent of the drafters, and upon the intention of Congress
in permitting the Rules to become law must be resolved in favor of the Kappus
construction. Furthermore, a number of subordinate considerations argue for
the broad resolution of the conflict.
Constricting 4(d)(7) would severely affect the scope of a number of Federal
Rules. Foremost would be the effect upon Rule 14. The purpose of this Rule-to
avoid circuity and multiplicity of action through the joinder of third parties-
would be frustrated if the party seeking the joinder were forbidden to do so
31 The magnitude of the problem is not as great here, since many federal statutes carry
with them their own service of process provisions. E.g., Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201-02 (1958); Federal Interpleader Act., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1958); Bank-
ruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 1011 (1958). See In re Clarke, 35 F. Supp. 227 (S.D. N.Y.
1940); United States v. United States Freight Co., 80 F.Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). Never-
theless, "the situation is analogous to that in cases where federal court jurisdiction is based
upon diversity of citizenship." Van Vie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22, 40 (N.D. Iowa 1948).
3128 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958).
32 17 Stat. 197 (1872).
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unless the third party defendant happened to live within the state in which
suit were being brought. The restrictive interpretation of 4(d)(7) wohld have
a similar effect on the operation of Rule 19, which provides for necessary joinder.
Since indispensable parties could not be joined unless they could be served
in the state of the suit, an increased number of actions would be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12(b) for failure to join all indispensable parties. Rule 22(1)
permits the interpleading of parties so as to prevent the holder of funds from
being exposed to double liability. Restrictions on out-of-state service would
quite obviously minimize the usefulness of this Rule in avoiding double li-
ability.3  These collateral effects of the restrictive interpretation of 4(d)(7)
are far reaching and militate for disavowance of this interpretation.
Finally, considerations of providing for a just trial warrant acceptance of
the broad application of 4(d)(7). The suit could then be filed in a convenient
forum-the state in which the cause of action arose. It is there that evidence
and witnesses are most conveniently available. The injured person is spared
the expense of travelling to the district of the nonresident defendant. When
a nonresident drives upon the highways of another state and becomes involved
in an accident, the obligation to return for suit is not an undue burden.3 4
33 In addition to rule interpleader, provided for by Rule 22(1), there exists a statutory
interpleader action created by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1958), and acknowledged in
Rule 22(2). The interpretation given Rules 4(d) (7) and 4(f) would-only affect service of process
in rule interpleader proceedings since nationwide service is provided for in statutory inter-
pleader actions. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1958).
2 4In addition it has been pointed out that the delay in the state courts is a major factor
to be taken into consideration. "For example, the trial courts in Cook County, Illinois, are
presently some four to five years behind on their trial calendars. To place the additional burden
on them of handling the cases which are now filed in the federal court under diversity jurisdic-
tion would be to cause a breakdown of the Illinois judicial system." Kurland, supra note
22, at 197 n.52.
THE DEFENSE OF ANTITRUST ILLEGALITY IN
CONTRACT ACTIONS
In 1958, the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Kosuga, restated its standards for
recognition of the defense of antitrust illegality to an action brought to enforce
a contract. That case, together with two subsequent cases decided by the Sixth
and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, 2 indicates the need for a reexamination
of the traditional doctrines3 and the possibility that a formulation may be
1358 U.S. 516 (1959).
2 Beloit Culligan Soft Water Service, Inc. v. Culligan, Inc., 274 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1959);
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 276 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1960).
The basic rule is that the courts will refuse absolutely to enforce illegal contracts. The
harshness of this rule, if rigidly applied, has led to the creation of a number of exceptions.
Three major exceptions are (1) contracts which are only "collaterally" illegal, (2) contracts in
which the illegal portion is sufficiently independent to be deemed severable, and (3) contracts
where the plaintiff is not in pari delicto with the defendant. Such contracts may be enforced
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